The first edition of Games and Information was published in 1989, when the topic of game theory was just starting to come to the attention of mainstream economists. Fifteen years later, interest in game theory has exploded, as have the number of textbooks written to introduce this material to students. Now entering its fourth edition, Rasmusen's book continues to hold its place as a relevant, advanced-level introduction to this fast-moving field. Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. The fourth edition brings this material totally up-to-date, and includes new end-of-chapter problems and classroom games, a math appendix, and is accompanied by a comprehensive website featuring solutions to problems and teaching notes. With its emphasis on applications of game theory and information economics to a vast array of disciplines, Games and Information, 4e will prove an indispensible tool for undergraduates studying advanced microeconomics as well as for graduate students in economics, business, mathematics and political science. Praise for the 3rd edition: "Rasmusen's Games and Information provides a wonderful coverage of the basics of game theory and information economics. His consistent style of presenting the theoretical structures lucidly unifies his text's wide and well-chosen range of applications. I wish that all my students could take a course based on this book, and envy them the opportunity." Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, University of Texas at Austin ldquo;This is a terrific book bringing together two strands in the recent literature on economic theory, namely game theory and the economics of asymmetric information. The style is brisk, the arguments are rigorous and it seems to be pitched at exactly the right level.rdquo; Partha Dasgupta, University of Cambridge
Widely praised when the first edition appeared,
Games and Information has been substantially enlarged and updated in the second edition. The text continues to reflect the importance in economic research of non-cooperative game theory and information economics. The topics of non-cooperative games and entry deterrence have been given their own chapters added on auditing, nuisance suits, recoordination and renegotiation, super moduality, signal jamming, market microstructure and government procurement. Many new chapters have been added and the number of homework problems has been greatly expanded.
Eric Rasmusen writes in a crisp and approachable style, relying wherever possible on explanation in place of technical proofs. The book will be an indispensable tool for advanced microeconomics courses and of considerable interest to anyone who needs to understand the economic research of the last ten years.